We introduce a pre-computation technique that drastically reduces the online computational complexity of mix-nets based on homomorphic cryptosystems. More precisely, we show that there is a permutation commitment scheme that allows a mix-server to: (1) commit to a permutation and efficiently prove knowledge of doing so correctly in the offline phase, and (2) shuffle its input and give an extremely efficient commitment-consistent proof of a shuffle in the online phase.
Introduction
Consider a situation where N senders S 1 , . . . , S N each have some input and wish to compute the sorted list of their inputs without revealing who submitted which message. A trusted party can do this by waiting until all senders have submitted some input, and then sort and output the list of all inputs. A protocol that emulates the trusted party is called a mix-net and the parties M 1 , . . . , M k that execute the protocol are referred to as mix-servers. As long as a certain fraction of the mix-servers are honest, the result should be correct and nobody should learn the correspondence between input ciphertexts and output messages. The obvious application for mix-nets is to conduct electronic elections, and this is also one of the applications Chaum [6] had in mind when he introduced mix-nets.
Many constructions of mix-nets are proposed in the literature, but few have provable security properties and many are actually flawed. The basic approach of all mix-nets with provable properties are based on ideas of Sako and Kilian [27] . The first rigorous definition of security was given by Abe and Imai [1] , but they did not construct a scheme satisfying their construction. Wikström [29] gives the first definition of a universally composable (UC) mix-net, the first UC-secure construction, and also a more efficient UC-secure scheme [30] . An important building block in the construction of a mix-net is a so called proof of a shuffle that allows the mix-servers to prove that they follow the protocol. The first efficient proofs of shuffles were given by Neff [21] and Furukawa and Sako [14] .
Mix-Nets Based On Homomorphic Cryptosystems
Recall the mix-net of Sako and Kilian [27] . They present their scheme in terms of the El Gamal cryptosystem [15] , but the idea works for any homomorphic cryptosystem.
A homomorphic cryptosystem CS = (Kg, E, D) that allows threshold decryption is employed. A cryptosystem is said to be homomorphic if for every public key pk ∈ PK, the plaintext space M pk , the randomness space R pk , and the ciphertext space C pk are groups, and for every m 0 , m 1 ∈ M pk and r 0 , r 1 ∈ M pk : E pk (m 0 , r 0 )E pk (m 1 , r 1 ) = E pk (m 0 m 1 , r 0 r 1 ). A joint public key pk is generated somehow such that each mixserver holds a secret share of the corresponding secret key sk . Each sender S i , holding a message m i , computes a ciphertext c 0,i = E pk (m i ), and then somehow submits it to the mix-servers. The mix-servers then take turns at re-encrypting and permuting these ciphertexts. Let L 0 = (c 0,1 , . . . , c 0,N ) be the list of submitted ciphertexts. For j = 1, . . . , k, M j chooses a permutation π and r j,i ∈ R pk randomly, computes c j,i = c j−1,π(i) E pk (1, r j,π(i) ) for i = 1, . . . , N , and then publishes L j = (c j,1 , . . . , c j,N ). In other words, each mix-server randomly re-encrypts each ciphertext and then outputs the resulting ciphertexts in random order. Then it proves, using a proof of a shuffle, that it formed L j from L j−1 in this way. Finally, the mix-servers jointly threshold-decrypt L k and output the resulting list of plaintexts. The idea is that since all mix-servers have randomly permuted the ciphertexts and the cryptosystem is assumed secure, it is infeasible to tell which plaintext corresponds to which original ciphertext in L 0 .
The above description is simplified in that the senders submit homomorphic ciphertexts directly, which is not secure [25] . In a provably secure construction, the plaintexts of corrupted senders must be extractable by the simulator without the secret key of the cryptosystem. Until recently, all known submission schemes were either only heuristically secure, or involved costly interaction, but there is now a provably secure solution to this problem for several well known homomorphic cryptosystems [31] .
Alternative Constructions. In the scheme of Furukawa et al. [13] , each mix-server not only re-encrypts and permutes its input, but also partially decrypts it. As a result, the final list L k essentially contains the plaintexts and no joint decryption step is needed. In the scheme of Wikström [30] , re-encryption is also eliminated entirely, i.e., each mixserver only partially decrypts and permutes its input. In a preliminary unpublished version of Neff [21] a proof of a shuffle for the first type of mix-net is described as well [22] . These schemes have special advantages over the above, but do not lend themselves well to pre-computation, since partial decryption must be done sequentially.
Very few other approaches to constructing mix-nets have any provable security properties [19] and several are actually flawed [1, 10, 28 ].
Previous Work On Improving Efficiency
There are more or less obvious techniques that can be used to reduce the computational complexity of a mix-net. If a threshold below k is used for the decryption key, then all mix-servers do not need to take part in the mixing process. In the execution of a public-coin honest verifier proof of knowledge the random challenge of the honest verifier must be generated jointly by the mix-servers, which is costly. But if unpredictability suffices, then longer challenges can be extracted from a random seed using a PRG. Precomputation can also be used in the coin-flipping protocols. The re-encryption factors can also be pre-computed and batch proof techniques [4] can be used to reduce the complexity of the proofs of correctness needed during joint decryption.
If such optimizations and pre-computations are used, the main computational cost lies in the proofs of shuffles. Thus, most previous work on reducing the complexity, e.g. [21, 14, 18, 13, 30] , focus on reducing the complexity of a particular proof of a shuffle. Some parts of these proofs can easily be pre-computed as well.
An alternative approach is used by Adida and Wikström [3] , who show that when the number of senders is relatively small, ideas from homomorphic election schemes [5] can be used to construct a mix-net where the online phase only requires decryption of a single ciphertext. The public-key obfuscated shuffle of Adida and Wikström [2] may also be viewed as a form of pre-computation, but their goal is not improved efficiency. In fact, their scheme is quite inefficient.
Our Contribution
We show how to split a proof of a shuffle into two protocols. The first protocol is used by a mix-server in the offline phase to prove knowledge of how to open a commitment to a permutation. The second protocol is used by a mix-server in the online phase to prove that it uses the permutation it committed to also during shuffling.
The first protocol is almost as efficient as the known proofs of shuffles; in fact it can be constructed from these, e.g., [21, 14, 18, 30] . Even without any standard optimization techniques such as simultaneous exponentiations, the computational complexity of the second protocol is half an exponentiation per sender in the El Gamal case and has similar properties for other cryptosystems. Thus, our pre-computation technique reduces the online computational complexity of virtually all mix-nets.
We also show that all known types of shuffles are instances of a generalized shuffle, where some homomorphic map φ pk : C pk × R pk → C pk is applied to each ciphertext and randomizer pair, and the resulting ciphertexts are permuted. In fact, we prove our results for this generalized shuffle. The generality of our result immediately gives that ciphertexts can be shuffled in parallel. Even ciphertexts of different cryptosystems can be shuffled in parallel, and distinct homomorphic maps can be used for ciphertexts of different cryptosystems.
The inspiration of this work comes from both Neff [21] and Furukawa and Sako [14] . Neff writes as follows about his "simple shuffle": "A single instance of this proof can be constructed to essentially 'commit' a particular permutation", but we are unable to derive our results starting from his "commitment". On the other hand, the Pedersen permutation commitment scheme used implicitly in the proof of a shuffle of Furukawa and Sako is perfectly suitable for constructing a fast commitment-consistent proof of a shuffle.
Notation
Natural numbers and integers are denoted by N and Z respectively. The ring of integers modulo n is denoted by Z n , Z * n denotes its multiplicative group, and SQ n denotes the subgroup of squares in Z * n . We use κ as the main security parameter, but also introduce several related parameters, e.g., the bit-size of challenges κ c . We identify the set of κ-bit strings and the set of positive integers in [0, 2 κ − 1] when convenient. A function (κ) is negligible if for every constant c and sufficiently large κ it holds that (κ) < κ −c . A function f (κ) is overwhelming if 1 − f (κ) is negligible. We denote the set of Npermutations by S N . We denote the set {1, . . . , l} by [l] and sometimes denote a list of elements (a 1 , . . . , a l ) by a [l] .
The Discrete Logarithm (DL) assumption for a group G q with generator g states that given a random element y ∈ G q , it is infeasible to compute x such that y = g x . The decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption states that when x, y, r ∈ Z q are randomly chosen, then it is infeasible to distinguish the distributions of (g x , g y , g xy ) and (g x , g y , g r ).
See Appendix F for formal definitions.
We view a commitment scheme as consisting of a parameter generation algorithm Gen and a deterministic commitment algorithm Com. On input 1 κ , Gen outputs a parameter ck which defines a message set M ck , a polynomially sampleable randomness space R ck , and a commitment space K ck . We write CK for the set of commitment parameters. On input ck ∈ CK, m ∈ M ck , and r ∈ R ck , Com outputs a commitment. To open a commitment the message and randomness is revealed.
We write CS = (Kg, E, D) for a homomorphic cryptosystem and M pk , R pk , and C pk for the abealian groups of messages, randomness, and ciphertexts defined by a public key pk . We let PK denote the set of all public keys. A homomorphic cryptosystem satisfies E pk (m 1 , r 1 )E pk (m 2 , r 2 ) = E pk (m 1 m 2 , r 1 r 2 ) for every pk ∈ PK, m 1 , m 2 ∈ M pk , and r 1 , r 2 ∈ R pk .
Throughout we assume that the order of the largest cyclic subgroup of C pk , and the order of any groups on which we base our commitment schemes, are bounded by 2 κ .
Background and Informal Description
Before we give details, it is worthwhile to recall some properties of batch proofs of discrete logarithms and proofs of shuffles. We also give a brief informal description of our commitment-consistent proof of a shuffle.
Batch Proofs. Consider a setting where many group elements y 1 , . . . , y N in some prime order group G p with generator g are given, and the prover knows x i ∈ Z p such that y i = g
. It is expensive to prove knowledge of each logarithm x i independently, but the use of batching [4] decreases this cost substantially as the following example shows, where P and V denotes the prover and verifier.
1. V picks e 1 , . . . , e N ∈ Z p randomly and hands them to prover.
Both parties compute
3. P shows that it knows the logarithm w such that y = g w using a standard honest verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
The reason that this is a proof of knowledge is that the extractor may rewind the prover to the first step several times until it has found N linearly independent vectors e j = (e j,1 , . . . , e j,N ) in Z N p for j = 1, . . . , N and extracted logarithms w 1 , . . . , w N such that 
which means that the logarithm of every individual element y l can be computed as
We remark that the components of the vectors can be chosen randomly in {0, 1} κe for a κ e much smaller than κ. From now on we use κ e to denote the bit-size of components of random vectors as the above. Another important observation, used to reduce the need for jointly generated randomness when the honest verifier is implemented jointly by several parties, is that it suffices that the vectors are unpredictable, e.g., the verifier may instead choose a random seed z for a PRG, hand it to the prover, and define (e 1 , . . . , e N ) = PRG(z).
Proofs of Shuffles. We do not go into the details of any particular proof of a shuffle, but we explain one of the ideas that appear in different forms in all known efficient schemes.
Consider a homomorphic cryptosystem such that the order of every non-trivial element in C pk equals a prime p. Given are a public key pk and ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c N ) and (c 1 , . . . , c N ) that are related by c i = c π(i) E pk (1, r π(i) ) for some permutation π and randomness r 1 , . . . , r N .
A key observation, first made by Neff [21] and Furukawa and Sako [14] , is that batch proofs are in some sense invariant under permutation and that this means that we can use batch techniques to construct an efficient proof of a shuffle. The idea can be described as follows, where we use a PRG to expand a seed into an unpredictable vector.
1. V picks a seed z ∈ {0, 1} κ randomly and hands it to P.
Both compute
i , where (e 1 , . . . , e N ) = PRG(z) and e i ∈ [0, 2 κe − 1].
e π(i) , hands it to V, and convinces V that it is formed correctly.
4. P proves knowledge of r ∈ R pk such that c = cE pk (1, r).
Note that the linear independence argument used in the basic batch proof above carries over to the shuffle setting, despite that some of the exponents are permuted (see Proposition 17 in Section A for details). The above description is simplified in that the prover must blind c to avoid leaking knowledge. The problem of convincing the verifier that the original exponents, re-ordered using a fixed permutation π, are used to form c is non-trivial, and solved differently in the various proofs of shuffles. If we ignore the cost of Step 3, then the above protocol is very efficient.
Commitment-Consistent Proofs of Shuffles
We observe that we can design Step 3 in such a way that almost all of it can be moved to the offline phase. Generators g 1 , . . . , g N of a group G p of prime order p are given as part of the setup of the proof of a shuffle, and it is assumed to be infeasible to compute any non-trivial relations among these (this follows from the DL assumption).
Suppose that each mix-server commits to a permutation π using Pedersen commitments [24] (a 1 , . . . , a N ) = (g r 1 g π −1 (1) , . . . , g r N g π −1 (N ) ) for random r 1 , . . . , r N ∈ Z p , and also proves knowledge of the r i and π such that (a 1 , . . . , a N ) was formed in this way. Then in the online phase the verifier can choose, and hand to the prover, a random seed z ∈ {0, 1} κ , set (e 1 , . . . , e N ) = PRG(z), and compute
Note that a is of a perfect form for executing a standard proof of knowledge of equal exponents. More precisely, we may now replace Step 3 above in the online phase by:
e π(i) and hands it to the verifier.
• Prover proves knowledge of r ∈ Z p and e 1 , . . . , e N ∈ {0, 1} κe with
The above is simplified in that some blinding factors are missing. The proof of knowledge of the exponents r , e 1 , . . . , e N , combined with the computational binding property of multi-base Pedersen commitments implies that e i = e π(i) for some permutation π(i). The computational complexity of the above protocol is very low, since almost all exponents have very few bits also in the proof of knowledge of equal exponents.
A Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle
In this section we first give more details of the commitment scheme and explain how any of the known proofs of shuffles can be used to prove knowledge of an opening of the commitment to a permutation. Then we present the commitment-consistent proof of a shuffle.
Permutation Commitments
We formalize the property we need from the Pedersen commitments above. A permutation commitment should allow the committer to compute a commitment Com (π) of a permutation π, but obviously any string commitment can be used to commit to a permutation. The special property of a permutation commitment is that if the receiver holds a list (e 1 , . . . , e N ), it can transform the permutation commitment into a commitment Com e (e π (1) , . . . , e π(N ) ), of another type, of the the list elements, but in order defined by π. Here κ com denotes the maximal bit size of each component of a list commitment. Definition 1. Let (Gen , Com ) be a commitment scheme for S N and let (Gen e , Com e ) be a commitment scheme for [0, 2 κcom − 1] N . The former is a κ com -permutation commitment scheme of the latter if Gen = Gen e and there exist deterministic polynomial time algorithms Map and Rand s.t. for every ck ∈ CK, r ∈ R ck , π ∈ S N and e = (e 1 , . (1) , . . . , e π(N ) ), Rand(r , e)) .
Construction 2 (Pedersen Commitment). The generation algorithm
Gen outputs random generators g 1 , . . . , g N ∈ G q , where G q is a cyclic group of known order q = t i=1 p i with p i ≥ 2 κcom . On input π ∈ S N and r 1 , . . . , r N ∈ Z q , the commitment algorithm Com computes a i = g r i g π −1 (i) , and outputs (a 1 , . . . , a N ). The parameter algorithm Gen e is identical to Gen . On input (e 1 , . . . , e N ) ∈ [0, 2 κcom − 1] N and r ∈ Z q , the algorithm
, and outputs a. The idea of using (generalized) Pedersen commitments [24] to commit to permutations is not novel, e.g., it is used implicitly in [14] , but the observation that a commitment of the first kind can be transformed into a commitment of the second kind seems new.
Proposition 3. Both (Gen , Com ) and (Gen e , Com e ) of Construction 2 are perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the DL assumption. The former is a permutation commitment of the latter.
The proof of the binding property is well known for prime order groups. A proof is given in Appendix A.
We will later make use of the following relation that corresponds to breaking a commitment scheme, i.e., finding two different ways to open a commitment.
Suppose a committer produces a permutation commitment a and the verifier computes a = Map ck (a , (e 1 , . . . , e N )). Then we expect that the committer only can open a as (e π(1) , . . . , e π(N ) ) for a fixed permutation π, i.e., if we repeat this procedure with different lists (e 1 , . . . , e N ) the same permutation must be used by the committer every time. We can not prove this, but it is easy to see that if it also can open a to a permutation π, then it must use this permutation every time. Recall that in our application, each mix-server proves knowledge of how to open a during the offline phase. Thus, if a witness for the following relation can be extracted in the online phase we reach a contradiction. This suffices to prove the overall security of a mix-net.
, and s i = s j and s i = s j for all i = j.
Proof of Knowledge of Opening
We now explain how we can construct, from any proof of a shuffle of El Gamal ciphertexts over a prime order group G p , a proof of knowledge that a Pedersen permutation commitment indeed is a commitment to a permutation.
Protocol 7 (Proof of Knowledge of Correct Opening).
Common Input: Pedersen commitment parameters g, g 1 , . . . , g N ∈ G p and a commitment (a 1 , . . . , a N ) ∈ G N p . Private Input: Permutation π ∈ S N and exponents r 1 , . . . , r N ∈ Z p such that a i = g ri g π −1 (i) .
1. P chooses r i ∈ Z p and h ∈ G p randomly, computes a i = g r i a i and b i = h ri+r i , and hands (a 1 , . . . , a N ) and (h, b 1 , . . . , b N ) to V.
2. P proves to V that it knows r i such that a i = g r i a i .
3. P and V view (h, g) as an El Gamal public key, and P uses its random commitment exponents r 1 +r 1 , . . . , r N +r N to give a proof of a shuffle that the list (
is a re-encryption and permutation of the list of trivial ciphertexts (1, g 1 ), . . . , (1, g N ) using the public key (h, g), i.e., it proves that it knows some r i such that
Proposition 8. The protocol inherits properties of the proof of a shuffle.
1. If the proof of a shuffle is public-coin, overwhelmingly (computationally) sound, and a proof of knowledge, then so is the protocol above.
If the proof of a shuffle is honest verifier (computationally under assumption A) zero-knowledge, then the above protocol is computationally zero-knowledge under the DDH assumption (and assumption A).
A proof is given in Appendix A. Without the blinding exponent r i the protocol is not even computationally zero-knowledge, since the adversary could in principle know r i . Some proofs of shuffles do not satisfy the standard computational versions of soundness, proof of knowledge, and zero-knowledge. In those cases the correspondingly more complicated security properties are also inherited, but we use the above proposition for simplicity. Readers with deeper understanding of proofs of shuffles should note that the basic principles of any proof of a shuffle can be used directly to construct a more efficient protocol, but this is not our focus here. We stress that the above simple solution is presented for completeness and ease of presentation. It is non-trivial to extend the above result to groups of composite order such as those considered in Construction 2.
Proof of Knowledge of Equal Exponents
Recall from our sketch in Section 2.1 that in our commitment-consistent proof of a shuffle, the prover essentially hands the product
e π(i) to the verifier and shows that the exponents used are those committed to in a commitment Com e (e π(1) , . . . , e π(N ) ). More precisely, we assume that: {h 1 , . . . , h k } is a generator set of the group C pk of ciphertexts, ck is a commitment parameter, and that the prover hands
e π(i) to the verifier in blinded form, i.e., it hands Com
e π(i) to the verifier for random exponents s [k] (and s 0 ∈ R ck ), and then proves that it knows all of these exponents and that they are consistent with the exponents committed to in Com e ck ((e π(1) , . . . , e π(N ) ), e 0 ) for some e 0 ∈ R ck . Thus, we construct a protocol for the following relation.
Definition 9. From a scheme (Gen e , Com e ) for [0, 2 κcom − 1] N , a commitment parameter ck output by Gen e , and a public key pk ∈ PK we define R eq ck ,pk to consist of all (pk , ck,
If the largest cyclic subgroup of C pk has order q = t i=1 p i with p i ≥ 2 κc , and a group G q of order q is available for which the DL problem is hard, then a sigma protocol with the challenge chosen from [0, 2 κc − 1], can be constructed using fairly standard methods. For completeness we give such a protocol in Appendix B.
Otherwise, we can either use Pedersen commitments over some prime order group G p and use a proof of equal exponents over groups of different orders using a FujisakiOkamoto commitment [12] as a "bridge", or we can replace the permutation commitment by a corresponding Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment directly. It is not hard to derive a shuffle of such commitments from Wikström's shuffle [30] . The drawback of using Fujisaki-Okamoto commitments is that they are based on the use of an RSA modulus, and such moduli are costly to generate in a distributed setting. We detail both solutions in the appendix.
Shuffle-Friendly Maps
To randomly shuffle a list of homomorphic ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c N ) usually means that each ciphertext is randomly re-encrypted and the resulting ciphertexts randomly permuted, but there are other possible shuffles. For the El Gamal cryptosystem, one can also partially decrypt during shuffling [13] , or if a special key set-up is used one can avoid random re-encryption entirely [30] . There are also at least two types of shuffles of (variants of) Paillier [23] ciphertexts. A careful look at these shuffles reveal that they are all defined by evaluating a homomorphic map and permuting the result.
Definition 10. A map φ pk is shuffle-friendly for a public key pk ∈ PK of a homomorphic cryptosystem if it defines a homomorphic map φ pk : C pk × R pk → C pk .
Example 11. Using the El Gamal cryptosystem over a group G p with public key pk = (g, y), where y = g x and x is the secret key, we have M pk = G p , R pk = Z p , and
denotes partial decryption and re-encryption using the secret share x 1 and randomness r. The decryption shuffle in [30] can be described similarly.
Example 12. Using the Paillier cryptosystem with a public key pk = n consisting of a random RSA modulus, we have M pk = Z n , R pk = Z * n , and C pk = Z * n 2 with encryption defined by E pk (m, r) = (1 + n) m r n mod n 2 . Re-encryption is then defined by φ n (c, r) = cr n mod n 2 .
Suppose we wish to prove that a ciphertext c is the result of invoking a particular shuffle-friendly map φ pk on another ciphertext c. If the shuffle-friendly map φ pk is public, e.g., it represents re-encryption, then what is needed is a proof that there exists some randomness r such that φ pk (c, r) = c . If the shuffle-friendly map itself is not public, e.g., re-encryption and partial decryption, then the map φ pk must then be defined by some hidden parameters. Without loss we assume that the map is defined by some relation to the public key. In the typical cases, the public key defines a secret key and the shuffle-friendly map is defined by the secret key. We consider a situation where the output ciphertext c is committed to as (Com
, and define a relation for a shuffle-friendly map as follows.
Definition 13 (Shuffle-Friendly Relation). Let pk ∈ PK, let φ pk be a shuffle-friendly map for pk and let ck be a commitment parameter. We define R map φ pk to consist of all pairs (pk , ck ,
Example 14 (Example 11 continued). Note that C pk = G p × G p is generated by h 1 = (g, 1) and h 2 = (1, g) with component-wise multiplication. If we consider a re-encryption and permutation shuffle and use Pedersen commitments over the group G p with commitment parameter ck = (g 1 , g 2 ), then the relation consists of all pairs of the form ((g, y) ,
For the typical shuffle-friendly maps of the El Gamal and Paillier cryptosystems, it is well known how to construct sigma protocols [7] for the corresponding shuffle-friendly relation using standard methods. We give some examples in Appendix E.
Details of the Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle
Next we give a detailed description of the protocol that allows a mix-server to prove in the online phase that it re-encrypted and permuted its input and that the permutation used is the same permutation it committed to in the offline phase. We denote by κ r a parameter that decides how well the commitments hide the committed values.
The two subprotocols can be executed in parallel and the second step of the protocol can be combined with the first move of the combined subprotocols.
Protocol 15 (Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle).
Common Input: A public key pk of a cryptosystem CS, a generating set {h 1 , . . . , h k } of C pk , a commitment parameter ck , a permutation commitment a ∈ K Private Input: Permutation π ∈ S N , s ∈ R ck and r 1 , . . . , r N ∈ R pk such that a = Com ck (π, s ), and c i = φ pk (c π(i) , r π(i) ).
1. V chooses a seed z ∈ {0, 1} κ randomly and hands it to P. Then both parties set (e 1 , . . . , e N ) = PRG(z), where e i ∈ {0, 1} κe , and computes a = Map ck (a , (e 1 , . . . , e N )).
2. P chooses t 0 ∈ R ck and t 1 , . . . , t k ∈ [0, 2 κ+κr − 1] randomly, and computes and hands to V
e π(i) .
3. P proves, using a proof of equal exponents, that it knows exponents t 0 , . . . , t k , (e 1 , . . . , e N ) (computed as (e π(1) , . . . , e π(N ) )), and e 0 (computed as Rand(s , (e 1 , . . . , e N ))) such that 4. P proves, using a proof of a shuffle map, that it knows exponents t 0 , . . . , t k and r (computed as
Note that the protocol and the proposition below are quite general; they apply for all the usual homomorphic cryptosystems, any shuffle-friendly map, and any number of ciphertexts shuffled in parallel (this is considered as a separate case in [21] ). It even applies to mixed settings where ciphertexts from different cryptosystems are shuffled in parallel. To state the security properties of the protocol we need to define a relation that captures a shuffle.
Definition 16. Let pk ∈ PK, let φ pk be a shuffle-friendly map for pk . Then we define the shuffle relation R shuf φ pk to consist of all pairs of the form (pk , c [N ] , c [N ] ), (π, r [N ] ) with c i = φ pk (c π(i) , r π(i) ).
In
Then for every pk ∈ PK and ck ∈ CK, the protocol is a public-coin honest verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof of the relation R Remark 18. It is observed in [30] that it does not suffice that a proof of a re-encryption and permutation shuffle is sound to be used in a provably secure mix-net. The permutation used by the mix-server to shuffle must also be extractable. However, extracting the permutation suffices.
A proof of the proposition is given in Appendix A. The basic idea is explained already in Section 2.1, except that in the general case the order q of the maximal cyclic subgroup of C pk may not be prime or may even be unknown. Note that if q is not prime, then the "random vectors" are in fact defined over a ring and not over a field, and consequently they are not vectors at all. Thus, not all elements are invertible, which potentially is a problem when trying to find a linear combination of the "random vectors" equal to any standard unit vector, which is needed to extract a witness. Since we assume that all factors of the order of C pk are large and all elements that must be inverted are random, this is not a problem and a witness can be extracted. However, if it is infeasible to compute the factorization of the order of C pk , or if the order itself is unknown, then this seems difficult. Fortunately, it suffices for the overall security of the mix-net that only the permutation can be extracted.
Application To Mix-Nets
At this point the reader should be comfortable with the idea that a proof of a shuffle can be split into a relatively costly offline part (Protocol 7) and a very efficient online part (Protocol 15), but how exactly do they fit into a mix-net?
Below we give a brief informal description of a mix-net based on the El Gamal cryptosystem over a group G p of prime order p. This illustrates how our protocols are used and gives an idea of the complexity of a complete mix-net using our approach.
Offline Phase.
1. The mix-servers, M 1 , . . . , M k , run a distributed key generation protocol to generate a joint public key (g, y) such that the corresponding secret key x, with y = g x , is secret shared among the mix-servers.
2. M j chooses r j,i ∈ Z p randomly and computes (g r j,i , y r j,i ) for i = 1, . . . , N .
3. M j chooses a random permutation π j ∈ S N , publishes a permutation commitment a j = Com (π j ), and proves knowledge of the committed permutation using Protocol 7 (and verifies the proofs of knowledge of all other mix-servers).
Online Phase.
S i chooses r
, where m i ∈ Z p is its message, and publishes this ciphertext.
Let
be the input ciphertexts. For l = 1, . . . , k:
, and proves using Protocol 15 that L j−1 and L j are consistent with a j . The random challenges needed in the subprotocols are generated jointly using a coinflipping protocol over a broadcast channel or bulletin board. Thus, all verifiers jointly either accept or reject proofs. It is natural to ask why the security property of our commitment-consistent proof suffices, since it is sound for R . This follows from the proof of knowledge property. For any successful prover there exists an extractor that outputs: a valid permutation π used to shuffle, a witness for R twin ck , or a witness for R perm ck . The second type of output directly contradicts the security of the commitment scheme. The third type of output combined with knowledge of how to open a j (such an opening can be extracted during the offline phase), also contradicts the security of the commitment scheme. Thus, in a simulation the extractor outputs the permutation with overwhelming probability, which suffices to prove the overall security of the mix-net.
Depending on the secret sharing threshold, all mix-servers may not need to shuffle the ciphertexts, and there are obvious ways to avoid the assumption that all senders submit an input. Many details are of course missing from the above description, but in the El Gamal case all subprotocols missing from the description are available. Distributed key generation can be done using Feldman and Pedersen secret sharing [11, 24] . The submission of inputs must allow extraction of the plaintexts of corrupt senders without using the secret key of the cryptosystem. This can be done [31] based on the CramerShoup cryptosystem [8] in such a way that each mix-server essentially pays the cost of checking the validity of N Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts. Batch techniques [4] can be used to reduce this further if most ciphertexts are expected to be valid, and validity checks can be done concurrently with receiving new ciphertexts. Random challenges can be generated using Pedersen verifiable secret sharing [24] . The sharing phase of many coins can be pre-computed, but since we only need a small number of bits in each challenge this type of optimization does not give much. Finally, during threshold decryption each mix-server must exponentiate N group elements to decrypt, but proving that this was done correctly can be done using batch proofs [4] . To summarize, the online running time of the mix-net is roughly the time to: validate N Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts, run the prover or verifier of k commitment-consistent proofs of shuffles of lists of ciphertexts of length N , decrypt N El Gamal ciphertexts, and prove or verify correctness of joint decryption, which is done using a batch proof.
Recall that κ e denotes the bit-size of elements in random "vectors", κ c denotes the bit-size of challenges, and κ r decides the statistical error in simulations and also the completeness of our subprotocols. For practical security parameters, e.g., κ = 1024, κ e = κ c = 80 and κ r = 20, we estimate the complexity of our protocol to N/2 squareand-multiply exponentiations. This can be reduced by a factor of 1/5 if simultaneous exponentation [20] is used, giving a complexity corresponding to N/10 square-and-multiply exponentations (see Appendix C for details).
Thus, our commitment-consistent proof of a shuffle is several times faster in the online phase than any of the known proofs of shuffles. As far as we know this makes our mix-net faster in the online phase than any previous mix-net.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. In both schemes, if two distinct valid openings can be computed, then we can write g b N i=1 g
where not all are zero. It is well known and easy to see that this contradicts the DL assumption.
For a commitment (a 1 , . . . , a N ) = Com ck (π, (r 1 , . . . , r N )), where ck = (g 1 , . . . , g N ), we have
which equals a commitment computed as Com e ck ((e π(1) , . . . , e π(N ) ), N i=1 r i e i ). This proves the second claim.
Proof of Proposition 8. The first claim is obvious. The zero-knowledge simulator picks b 1 , . . . , b N ∈ G p randomly and then invokes the simulators of the batch proof and the proof of a shuffle. A standard hybrid argument shows that the resulting distribution is polynomially indistinguishable from the distribution of a real interaction, under the DDH assumption.
Proof of Proposition 17. The zero-knowledge simulator chooses z randomly as in the protocol, chooses t 0 ∈ R e ck and b 1 ∈ C pk randomly, computes b 1 = Com e ck ((0, . . . , 0), t 0 ), and then invokes the statistical zero-knowledge simulators of the subprotocols. Due to the statistical zero-knowledge of the commitment scheme the resulting distribution is statistically close to the distribution of a real interaction.
Suppose that we, by repeatedly invoking the extractors of the subprotocols, manage to extract N different e j = (e j,1 , . . . , e j,N ) with distinct components and exponents t j,0 , . . . , t j,k , and e j,0 , . . . , e j,N , satisfying
e j,i , and ((e j,1 , . . . , e j,N ), e j,0 ) , where a j = Map ck (a , (e j,1 , . . . , e j,N )), and exponents t j,0 , . . . , t j,k , and r j satisfying ((t j,1 , . . . , t j,k ), t j,0 ) and
i , r j , for j = 1, . . . , N . The witness extracted from a subprotocol may be a witness of R twin ck , in which case we are done. From now on we assume that this is not the case.
If it is not the case that (t j,1 , . . . , t j,k ) = (t j,1 , . . . , t j,k ) for all j = 1, . . . , N , then we have found two distinct openings of a commitment b j,1 , i.e., a witness for ck with respect to the relation R twin ck . Thus, we may drop the prime symbol and simply write (t j,1 , . . . , t j,k ).
If it is not the case that e j,i = e j,π(i) for some fixed permutation π and all j = 1, . . . , N and i = 1, . . . , N , then we have found a witness for ck with respect to the relation R perm ck . Thus, we assume that the same permutation π appears for every list and simply write (e j,π(1) , . . . , e j,π(N ) ) instead of (e j,1 , . . . , e j,N ).
We conclude that
i , r j for j = 1, . . . , N . We have now extracted a permutation π (the extractor only needs to extract a single list (e j,π(1) , . . . , e j,π(N ) ) to find π). It remains to prove that with overwhelming probability there exists (r 1 , . . . , r N ) such that (π, r 1 , . . . , r N ) is a witness for R shuf φ pk . Suppose that for every l = 1, . . . , N , there exist x l,1 , . . . , x l,N ∈ Z q , where q is the order of the maximal cyclic subgroup of C pk , such that N j=1 x l,j e j is the lth standard unit "vector" in Z N q (since Z q is not a field, this is not a vector space). We conclude that
where the third equality follows from the linearity of the shuffle map φ pk . Thus, we have c l = φ pk (c π(l) , r π(l) ) for some r π(l) , l = 1, . . . , N as expected. We stress that we do not claim that the x l,i values can be computed. In fact, when the order q of the largest cyclic subgroup of C pk is not known, then it seems very hard to compute such values.
To prove soundness and that the knowledge error is negligible, it remains to show that we can extract the values described at the beginning of the proof with high probability. First we note that without loss we can combine the two subprotocols into a single protocol by exploiting their special soundness and zero-knowledge properties, i.e., we may use the same challenge for both protocols.
Consider the following thought experiment. For any prover P * , we construct a new prover P + that honestly chooses (e 1 , . . . , e N ) instead of the verifier, and then invokes P * . The new prover obviously takes part in a different protocol, but we can still consider the problem of extracting two accepting interactions with distinct challenges from P + . A standard rewinding argument (see for example Lemma 8 in [26] ), shows that there exists a polynomial T (κ) and an extractor X 0 such that if the success probability of P * is at least δ(κ), then X 0 outputs, in expected time O(T (κ)/(δ(κ) − 2 −κc )), a list (e j,1 , . . . , e j,N ), t j,0 , . . . , t j,k , and r j , satisfying our requirements for j = 1, . . . , N .
We let the extractor X 1 invoke the extractor X 0 exactly N times and output the extracted set of values. It is clear that X 1 runs in expected time O(N · T (κ)/(δ(κ) − 2 −κc )). We claim that if δ(κ) is not too small, then with positive probability the lists (e j,1 , . . . , e j,N ) output by X 0 determines a witness of R map φ pk . We remind the reader that we do not claim that such a witness can be extracted efficiently, only that it exists, and we prove that it exists by showing that there exists a non-efficient extraction procedure that outputs it with high probability.
In the protocol, the list (e 1 , . . . , e N ) is derived from a small random seed z using a PRG. We first analyze an idealized setting where the output from the PRG is perfectly random and then show that using a PRG is almost as good.
If a list (e 1 , . . . , e N ) satisfies e i = e i for all i = i , then we say that it is internally unique. It is easy to see that a randomly chosen list (e 1 , . . . , e N ) ∈ [0, 2 κe − 1] N is not internally unique with probability at most N 2 2 −κe .
We say that some lists e 1 , . . . , e j are in general position, if the set of linear combinations of these lists with coefficients in Z q contains lists of the following form e 1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, e 1,j+1 , . . . , e 1,N ) e 2 = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, e 2,j+1 , . . . , e 2,N ) . . . . . . . . . e j = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 1, e j,j+1 , . . . , e 2,N ) .
Suppose that some lists e 1 , . . . , e j in general position are given and consider the probability that a randomly chosen list e j+1 can be used to extend the set of lists in general position. By construction, e j+1,j+1 is randomly chosen in [0, 2 κe −1], where 2 κe is smaller than any factor of q (the maximal order of any cyclic subgroup of C pk ), and there are obviously at most κ/κ e factors in q. Thus, from independence we conclude that the probability that e j+1,j+1 − j l=1 e l,j+1 e j+1,l is not invertible modulo q is bounded by κ κe 2 −κe . Thus, the probability that a randomly chosen list can not be used to extend the sequence of lists in general position is bounded by κ κe 2 −κe . In the protocol, the list (e 1 , . . . , e N ) is derived from a random seed. If this would change the probabilities derived above more than by a negligible amount, then we could obviously break the PRG. Thus, using a PRG, the probability that the list e j+1 is not internally unique or does not extend the set of lists in general position is bounded by N (N + κ κe )2 −κe + 0 (κ) for some negligible function 0 (·).
Suppose now that the first j calls to X 0 resulted in internally unique lists in general position. Then during the next call to the extractor X 0 , the expected number of sampled lists is bounded by X 0 's expected running time O(T (κ)/(δ(κ)−2 −κc )), which means that the expected number of generated lists that are either not internally unique or does not extend the already existing set of lists in general position is bounded by
Thus, the probability that some list output by X 1 is not internally unique, or that the lists are not in general position is upper bounded by
This is negligible for a negligible δ(κ), which concludes the proof of soundness.
B Proof of Equal Exponents For Pedersen Commitments
We provide a detailed description and analysis of the proof of equal exponents for the solution based on Pedersen commitments.
Protocol 19 (Proof of Equal Exponents).
Common Input: A public key pk of a cryptosystem CS, a generating set {h 1 , . . . , h k } of C pk , a cyclic group G q that has the same order q as the largest cyclic subgroup of C pk , generators g, g 1 , . . . , g N of G q , a commitment of exponents a ∈ G q , ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c N ) ∈ C pk , a commitment (b 1 , b 2 ), where b 1 ∈ G q and b 2 ∈ C pk . Private Input: Exponents e 1 , . . . , e N ∈ [0, 2
κe+κc+κr − 1] and t 0 , l 0 , . . . , l k ∈ Z q , randomly, and computes and hands to V the following elements
2. V chooses a challenge c ∈ [0, 2 κc − 1] randomly and hands it to P.
3. P computes and hands to V the following replies
κe+κc+κr , for i = 1, . . . , N , and
Note that the prover can pre-compute α and the cost of computing β 1 may be ignored when N is much larger than k. Thus, the prover must essentially compute β 2 in the online phase. The verifier on the other hand must perform its verifications for both α and β 2 in the online phase. 
B.1 A Special Pre-computation Trick For El Gamal
When we use the El Gamal cryptosystem the ciphertext space equals G q × G q . In this case the verifier can use the following pre-computation technique based on batch proofs. Let us write c i = (u i , v i ). The verifier chooses x ∈ [0, 2 κe −1] randomly and computes
When it receives the reply to its challenge c it performs the verification as follows
The reason for doing this is that the verifier can pre-compute all g x i , and that this reduces the online complexity by a factor of 2/3. A standard batch-proof argument implies that the above verification is essentially as sound as the original.
C Online Complexity Estimate In the El Gamal Case
In this section it is understood that we consider the online complexity of the protocol. i for some elements u i and κ -bit exponents e i for some κ < κ, which means that simultaneous exponentation [20] is directly applicable. The complexity of one square-and-multiply exponentiation with a κ -bit exponent corresponds to κ squarings and κ /2 multiplications on average.
There are two ways the complexity is reduced in simultaneous exponentiation. Firstly, the squarings are done for all N elements at the same time, i.e., the cost for squaring is negligible when N is large. Secondly, the number of multiplications is reduced by precomputing products of subsets of the elements u i . One can only compute all possible combinations for a small number of elements at a time. Thus, the idea is to divide the elements into groups of w elements for some width w. For each such group u 1 , . . . , u w of elements and every I ⊂ {1, . . . , w} the product i∈I u e i i is then computed. These products can be computed using 2 w multiplications. Given all such products, multiplication by any combination of the elements u 1 , . . . , u w can be done at the cost of a single multiplication.
Thus, the average cost of computing
i is roughly N w ·2 w + N w κ multiplications, where κ is the bitsize of the exponents. We conclude that the complexity of Protocol 15, using the parameters above, corresponds to 2( )N = 98N if we set w = 4. This sums to 157N multiplications.
We may estimate the number of multiplications computed using square-and-multiply exponentiations by 1.5(4 · 80 + 2 · 80 + 2 · 20)N ≤ 780N . Thus, if simultaneous exponentiation is used the complexity can be reduced by a factor of 154/780 ≈ 1/5. This gives a total complexity corresponding to N/10 square-and-multiply exponentiations.
However, optimized code such as GMP [16] already uses other tricks, such as sliding window exponentiation, which are to some extent in conflict with using simultaneous exponentiation [17] . Thus, one can not expect a reduction in complexity by a factor of 1/5 starting from an optimized implementation.
D Solution Based On Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitments
An alternative to using Pedersen commitments is to use Fujisaki-Okamoto commitments [12] . This is less practical, since such commitments assume the availability of an RSA modulus (which is costly to generate jointly), but it allows construction of commitmentconsistent proofs of shuffles for cryptosystems where the order of the group of ciphertexts is unknown.
D.1 Permutation Commitment
Construction 21 (Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitment). The parameter generation algorithm Gen outputs a random RSA modulus n = pq, where p and q are random κ/2-bit safe primes, and random generators g, g 1 , . . . , g N ∈ SQ n . On input π ∈ S N and r 1 , . . . , r N ∈ [0, 2 κ+κr − 1], the commitment algorithm Com computes a i = g r i g π −1 (i) , and outputs (a 1 , . . . , a N ). The parameter algorithm Gen e is identical to Gen . Proof. The statistical hiding property follows since the random exponents r i and r are chosen randomly in [0, 2 κ+κr − 1] and all generators generate the group of squares with overwhelming probability, where κ is an upper bound on the orders of g and g i . In both schemes it holds that if two distinct valid openings can be computed, then we can write
where not all are zero. In Corollary 34 we extend known results [9] and show that this contradicts the strong RSA assumption.
For any Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment (a 1 , . . . ,
which equals a commitment Com e ck (e π(1) , . . . , e π(N ) , N i=1 r i e i ), which proves the second claim. The only potential issue is that the bit-size of N i=1 r i e i is larger than the bit-size of any individual r i . Thus, formally speaking we need to consider two variants of the cryptosystem with different randomness spaces, but we do not make this explicit.
The above forms of (generalized) Fujisaki-Okamoto commitments are used implicitly in Wikström [30] .
D.2 Proof of Equal Exponents For Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitments
The next protocol can be used to provide a proof of equal exponents both in the case where Pedersen commitments are used and when Fujisaki-Okamoto commitments are used. In the first case it is useful as a "bridge", when the order of C pk is unknown or if it is infeasible to construct a group G q for which the DL assumption holds, where q is the order of the largest cyclic subgroup of C pk . In the second case it is used directly in the natural way.
Protocol 23 (Generic Proof of Equal Exponents).
Common Input: Fujisaki-Okamoto parameters n and h i ∈ SQ n for i = 1, . . . , n 0 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z * n , and group elements y j ∈ G j , g j,i ∈ G j for i = 0, . . . , n j and j = 1, 2, 3 and with n 3 = n 1 + n 2 . Private Input: Exponents w 1 , w 2 , x 1,0 , x 2,0 ∈ [0, 2 κ+κr − 1] and x j,i ∈ [0, 2 κj − 1] for i = 1, . . . , n j and j = 1, 2 such that
2,i , and
, and
randomly and computes and hands to V the following elements
Definition 24. Let ck = (n, (h i ) n 0 i=1 ) be defined as in the protocol. Then we define the relation R geq ck to consist of all (ck , z 0 , z 1 , y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , (g 1,i ) Below we show how a proof of equal exponents for R eq ck ,pk ∨ R twin ck can be derived from the above protocol when Pedersen commitments are used by the mix-servers to commit to their permutations.
Protocol 26 (Proof of Equal Exponents).
Common Input: A public key pk of a cryptosystem CS, a generating set {h 1 , . . . , h k } of C pk , generators g, g 1 , . . . , g N of a group G q of order q, a commitment of exponents a ∈ G q , ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c N ) ∈ C pk , a commitment (b 1 , b 2 ), where b 1 ∈ G q and b 2 ∈ C pk . Private Input: Exponents e 1 , . . . , e N ∈ [0, 2 κe − 1], s 0 , . . . , s k , e 0 ∈ Z q such that: a = 2. Invoke Protocol 23 on the above elements and exponents.
F Assumptions F.1 Discrete Logarithm Assumptions
Definition 30. The discrete logarithm assumption for a cyclic group G q of order q, with generator g, states that if x ∈ Z q is randomly chosen, then for every polynomial time adversary A, Pr[A(g, g x ) = x] is negligible.
Definition 31. The decision Diffie-Hellman assumption for a cyclic group G q of order q, with generator g, states that if x, y, r ∈ Z q are randomly chosen, then for every polynomial time adversary A: | Pr[A(g, g x , g y , g xy ) = 1] − Pr[A(g, g x , g y , g r ) = 1]| is negligible.
F.2 Strong RSA Assumption
Definition 32. The strong RSA assumption states that if p and q are randomly chosen κ/2-bit safe primes, n = pq, and g ∈ SQ n is randomly chosen, then for every polynomial time adversary A, Pr[A(n, g) = (β, η) ∧ η = ±1 ∧ β η = g mod n] is negligible.
The following lemma is proved in [9] .
Lemma 33. Let (n, g) be randomly chosen RSA parameters as defined in Definition 32, and let h ∈ SQ n be randomly chosen. Then for every polynomial time adversary A Pr[A(n, g, h) = (β, η 0 , η 1 , η 2 ) ∧ |η 0 | ∈ [1, 2 κ/2−1 ]
Pr[A(n, g, h) = (β, η 1 , η 2 ) ∧ (η 1 , η 2 ) = (0, 0) ∧ g η 1 = h η 2 mod n]
are negligible in κ under the strong RSA assumption.
Corollary 34. Let (n, g) be randomly chosen RSA parameters as defined in Definition 32, and let g 1 , . . . , g N ∈ SQ n be randomly chosen. Then for every polynomial N and polynomial time adversary A Pr A(n, (g i )
g η i i = 1 mod n are negligible in κ under the strong RSA assumption.
Proof. Suppose that A contradicts the first claim. Then we can construct an adversary A that contradicts the first claim of Lemma 33 as follows. It chooses an index t ∈ [1, N ] randomly and defines g t = h and g i = g r i for i = t, where r i ∈ [0, 2 κ+κr − 1] is chosen randomly for i = t. Then it invokes A on n and these generators. When it returns (β, (η i ) N i=0 ), A defines β = β, η 0 = η 0 , η 2 = η t , and η 1 = i =t η i r i , and returns (β , η 0 , η 1 , η 2 ). Conditioned on (β, (η i ) N i=0 ) satisfying the requirements in the lemma, the probability that η 0 η t is 1/N , and by construction we have β η 0 = g η 1 h η 2 mod n. Thus, A contradicts the first claim of Lemma 33.
Suppose that A contradicts the second claim. Then the following adversary A contradicts the second claim of Lemma 33. It defines g i = g r i for randomly chosen r i ∈ [0, 2 κ+κr − 1] and invokes A on n and these generators. When A returns (η i ) N i=1 , it defines η 1 = N i=1 r i η i and η 2 = 0. Then it returns (η 1 , η 2 ). It is easy to see that conditioned on η i = 0 for some i, η 1 is non-zero with overwhelming probability, since there are exponentially many r i consistent with g i for every i = 1, . . . , N .
